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The grand vision of Vietnam's revolutionaries has soured.
The economy has spent years in a state of entrenched 
crisis. Now the Vietnamese Communists have embarked 
on radical reforms. But can they avoid the malaise 
of the other former centrally-planned economies, 
asks Graham Larcombe.
The fall of Saigon in 1975 was one of the significant events of this century. With the defeat of the South Vietnamese regime, the 
Vietnamese had aspirations to rebuild their 
country in a form "ten times more beautiful" and 
to reconstruct their society according to socialist 
principles. Despite the suffering and disruption 
in the north and south, there was also a sense of 
optim ism  that independence from  foreign  
domination would enable the country to unify 
and recover from the devastation of 30 years of 
war.
The north, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, had 
begun the process of socialist transformation of the 
economy in the 'fifties, following a model of development
that emphasised central planning, the collectivisation of 
agriculture and giving priority to heavy industry. With 
this experience, the task of transforming the 'capitalist' 
south was not seen as too arduous, particularly given the 
fact that the revolutionary forces had militarily defeated 
the world's most powerful nation.
Fifteen years later, the vision of a prosperous and 
reconstructed Vietnam has soured. The country remains 
one of the poorest twenty countries in the world. The 
economy has been in chronic crisis with inflation soaring 
to 300% in 1987. Unemployment statistics are unreliable, 
but estimates range from between 13% and 20%. This 
exdudes underemployment, with people accommodated 
in tasks with very low productivity. Economic growth 
follows a stop-go pattern and, in recent years, has been 
dedining.
Of course, an overriding feature is the economic and
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sodal consequences of war. Not only are they paying for 
defeating the US militarily, they have also paid heavily for 
their intervention in Cambodia, through isolation by the 
West, and cessation of aid and trade opportunities. But the 
development strategy pursued by the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam (SRV) after reunification has nevertheless had 
disastrous economic consequences.
Since the late 1970s a reformist leadership has struggled 
to bring about a reorientation of the economy, away from 
the command economy influenced by the orthodox Soviet 
model, and towards decentralisation of decision making 
and market reforms.
Like their counterparts in many Third World countries 
such as Angola, China, Cuba, South Yemen, North Korea 
and Mozambique, the Vietnamese revolutionaries were 
overwhelmingly influenced by the Soviet experiences, par­
ticularly the "building of socialism in one country" ap-
• proach adopted by Stalin, aimed at forcing the 
development of the productive forces of the economy in a 
hostile international environment.
The key component of the Soviet model is to replace 
market transactions, where resources are allocated accord­
ing to the law of value, with planning, where resources are 
allocated in theory according to the priorities of society. In 
simple terms, under central planning, key enterprises are 
supplied with resources from the state and directed to 
produce a certain quantity of output. A centralised 
bureaucracy develops, which has responsibilities for 
drawing up plans, choosing priority sectors, and setting 
targets for individual enterprises.
Profits and prices are not particularly important in guid­
ing economic activity. Key prices are set by administered 
decision, and may be designed to achieve social objectives, 
such as cheap agricultural products for industrial workers 
rather than reflecting the forces of supply and demand or 
the cost of production to the peasantry. In the orthodox 
model, enterprise losses are subsidised by the state. Profits 
over a certain level are transferred to the state. Wages are 
kept low to support the maximisation of the surplus avail­
able for investment and wage differentials are compressed.
It is all too apparent, however, that the orthodox socialist 
model, with its dependence on a powerful centralised 
bureaucracy, is in deep crisis. The political developments 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have reverberated 
throughout the socialist world. The Vietnamese have their 
own version of perestroika, 'doi moi', meaning renewal or 
renovation. In addition, they have become more critical of 
their own mistakes.
Although encouraged by trends in the Soviet Union, the 
Vietnamese had embarked on a process of economic 
reform in 1979 prior to perestroika. This process ac­
celerated over the 'eighties. Developed socialist states such 
as Hungary, and underdeveloped socialist states such as 
China, Vietnam and Mozambique, have been forced by 
circumstances to modify or, indeed, to dismantle central 
planning mechanisms. This suggests that central planning 
8enerates certain intractable economic problems.
As well as actual experiences, there are now some sub­
stantial economic works analysing the internal dynamics
and limitations of centrally planned economies - those of 
British economic historian Alec Nove and Hungarian 
economist Janos Komai are two of the most prominent. 
This body of thought suggests two laws of motion for these 
societies:
1. state socialist systems have an innate tendency to 
underproduction and shortage which is related to a series 
of macro- and micro-economic conflicts over the distribu­
tion of resources, including industry versus agriculture, 
and investment versus consumption;
2. state socialist systems are marked by innate political 
tendency to the assertion of state control, eradicating all 
autonomous elements in civil society.
Both these features are crucial in the Vietnamese case.
When the South Vietnamese regime collapsed in April 
1975, the country was devastated. In the north, the in­
dustrial base and supporting infrastructure which had 
developed with Soviet assistance between 1955-65 had 
been severely damaged by US bombings between 1965-68 
and 1972. As a consequence of the bombings, industrial 
production had been dispersed. It also declined. Although 
the DRV had given special attention to heavy industrialisa­
tion, the sector was in disarray at the end of the war. In 
addition, the agricultural sector in the north was charac­
terised by low productivity and small surpluses resulting 
from the priority given to the war effort, but also to the lack 
of incentives given to the peasantry. Trade was hampered 
by the poor transportation system.
The south, of course, had developed within a capitalist 
framework, and was highly dependent on US aid. Over 
30% of the population was urbanised, the rural sector was 
more orientated to market transactions, and a large propor­
tion of the workforce was engaged in activities dependent 
on US support, in the military and service activities.
Given the disruption caused by the war, the new nation­
al leadership in 1975 initially emphasised gradualism and 
acceptance of the importance of the private sector in the 
south as a means of minimising disruption to the post-war 
economy. But the pragmatic period did not last long. The 
Hanoi leadership moved quiddy to develop polides for the 
sodalist transformation of the south. The reasons for the 
change are undear. It may have been due to a combination 
of factors induding: resistance in the south, the belief that 
the country could only be unified with one model of 
development and the DRV model was the most ap­
propriate, and deteriorating relations with China and 
Cambodia.
Formal reunification took place in 1976 with the estab­
lishment of the Sodalist Republic of Vietnam. This was 
followed by an intensive drive towards sodalisation. The 
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80) established very am­
bitious targets. The plan followed the orthodox sodalist 
model. It accorded priority to heavy industry and the 
establishment of national institutions modelled on the 
DRV, and exerted pressure on southern peasants to join 
production collectives and on industrialists to offer their 
enterprises to the state. In 1978,30,000 private businesses 
closed. Large scale industries were brought under the 
control of central ministries, and central planning became
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the norm. Enterprises were allocated targets for outputs, 
and inputs were determined by administrative decision. 
The state took control of foreign trade.
In the view of the authorities, the market would play a 
much reduced role. The State paid low prices for agricul­
tural products and, in turn, would provide the peasants 
with subsidised consumer goods. Under the central plan­
ning approach, decisions relating to inputs and outputs 
were made with disregard to costs and capital return. 
Loss-making enterprises were supported by the State. 
Profitable entyerprises returned their surpluses to the 
State. For enterprises and individuals, there was little 
scope for material incentives.
The experiment in accelerated 'socialist transformation' 
had disastrous consequences. In the late 'seventies there 
were several contributory factors to Vietnam's woes: 
natural calamities, war and the refusal of the US to provide 
reparations and the cessation of western aid. These all 
hindered Vietnam capacity to rebuild. Nevertheless, enor­
mous mistakes were made in the handling of the economy 
over this period. Firstly, there was an enormous gap be­
tween what was expected and what the country could 
achieve after the shattering experience of war. There was 
an implicit belief that the country could leapfrog over 
different stages of development. Management by exhorta­
tion is a characteristic of many models of accelerated 
socialist transformation. The Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) was assisted by the fact that there was much 
goodwill towards it, being the political force which had 
unified the country. On the other hand, there are limits to 
the sacrifices a war weary population can make.
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the economic 
structure and social relations in the south were poorly an 
analysed. Thirdly, the strategy of reliance on socialist 
ownership of heavy industry created a number of inef­
ficiencies and imbalances in the economy. Low prices and 
lack of material incentives discouraged agricultural 
production. Enterprises were not free to choose their in­
puts which tended to be unreliable and of low quality. 
Given unreliability, enterprises began hoarding in an an­
ticipation of shortages. The gap between what was ex­
pected and what was possible was so unrealistic that 
requirements came to be disregarded. Underproduction 
became a characteristic of the system. Poor management 
and lack of capital exacerbated the problems.
The State supported a growing number of loss-making 
enterprises by printing more money. The shortages of 
planned activities created opportunities for speculators 
and corrupt party officials to make private gains on the 
black market. Inflation quickly rose to 50-60%.
This situation could not continue. Living standards had 
declined. People had less food in the north than during 
even the most testing periods of the war. Annual growth 
slumped to 1.5%. Industrial output stagnated. A chronic 
balance of payments crisis emerged.
The rapidly deteriorating economic and political en­
vironment forced the VCP to re-evaluate dramatically its 
development strategies. Indeed, according to current VCP 
secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh, the error committed
by the party and government in the past was that during 
the transition period to socialism they had tried to ignore 
objective laws of economics.
The Sixth Plenum of the Fourth Congress in 1979 became 
a watershed in this process, with the new program that 
marked a shift away from the orthodox socialist model. 
The program recognised that the rapid pace of socialist 
transformation was disrupting the economy and needed 
to be slowed down. The party acknowledged that some 
state-produced goods can be better produced by the 
private sector. Most importantly, they began to emphasise 
material incentives as a means to boost productivity. A 
contract system was introduced in agriculture, giving 
greater incentives to families and individuals. Piece rates 
and bonuses were introduced in industry. Greater 
autonomy was given to enterprises.
The congress and interim plenums over the 'eighties 
strengthened the momentum towards reform. The Fifth 
Party Congress in 1982 confirmed the move away from 
heavy industry and engaged in criticisms of the economic 
and financial management of enterprises. In 1985, the 
Central Committee passed a major resolution dealing with 
the problems of price, wages and a national currency, 
moving them towards market determined rates. Given the 
severe economic difficulties and political problems that 
have persisted during the 'eighties, the Sixth Party Con­
gress, December 1986, adopted the slogan 'Renewal or 
Death', emphasising the urgency of the reform measures. 
The current development strategy uses the slogan 
'commercialisation' of internal and foreign trade, i.e. 
economic resources are to be exchanged through commer­
cial transaction rather than through administered means. 
Major attention in productive activities is now given to 
food, consumer goods, and exports.
How effective have these reforms been? Initially, there 
was a slow response. Bureaucratic inertia, inefficiency, 
poor communications, and vested interests delayed the 
implementation of the reform program. Although there 
appears to have been a degree of consensus within the 
party regarding the need for reform, there were differences 
regarding the pace of reform.
Conservative views within the VCP have expressed 
concerns about the slow pace of socialisation, about the 
increase of 'negative phenomena' such as speculation and 
corruption, and about the dominance of private traders, 
inflation and the emergence of class inequalities.
In terms of economic performance, however, the 
reforms began to stimulate a recovery in the economy. 
During the period 1981-84, annual growth averaged 5.7%. 
Industrial output increased by 14.2%. However, major 
problems persisted and some, in fact, intensified - for 
example, the continuation of subsidies to state enterprises, 
low productivity and continuing shortages.
As the Vietnamese economy moved down the road of 
market oriented reforms, there was a massive surge in 
inflation which soared to several hundred percent by the 
mid-'eighties. Given the acute shortages in the economy, 
it was inevitable that price liberalisation would lead to 
inflation, with increasing supply (resulting largely from
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the reforms) being outstripped by faster increasing 
demand.
Vietnam had few options. Faced with accelerating infla­
tion due to price reforms, other socialist countries such as 
China have tended to put a brake on price reforms.
The Vietnamese government, on the other hand, imple­
mented drastic measures to cut inflation, yet continued 
along the road of price liberalisation. The subsidised sys­
tem of administered prices had been virtually abolished 
and replaced by market determined prices, and currency 
reforms had brought official exchange rates in line with 
black market rates.
To reduce inflation dramatically, the Vietnamese intro­
duced drastic fiscal and monetary measures. In the fiscal 
area, grants to enterprises were curtailed and subsidies to 
producers and consumers were eliminated. The most 
dramatic measure was in monetary policy where interest 
rates were set above the inflation rate, initially over 100%. 
This is like putting an economy into 'cold turkey'. As a 
result, lending to enterprises virtually ceased, and deposits 
soared.
By late last year these measures were beginning to have 
an effect Inflation had, to a large extent, been squeezed out 
of the system. Enterprises were forced to take drastic action 
to remain viable. They could no longer depend on sub­
sidised material supplies, maintaining large stocks, and 
grants from government. Although there has been pres­
sure to relax the squeeze, the authorities are determined to 
continue with measures to liberalise the economy. As a 
consequence, there are likely to be a number of economic 
and social costs; enterprises will close down and un­
employment will increase.
In the last few years the Vietnamese have gone further 
in acknowledging the need for a private sector and en­
couraging private investment. In 1988, the Council of Min­
isters passed a resolution accepting the "positive role and 
long term existence of the private and individual sectors". 
In 1988, a new foreign investment law was promulgated. 
Some enterprises can be entirely foreign-owned. Foreign 
investors are given tax concessions, as low as 10% for the 
first four years. Investors can repatriate a proportion of 
profits and guarantees are given against nationalisation. 
Officials say they looked to South Korea, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong for models.
planning does not mean that planning becomes irrelevant. 
Planning is a key instrument in overcoming under­
development. It enables resources to be focused on those 
areas which can boost economic performance - it may be 
infrastructure, boosting export industries, or improving 
research into agriculture productivity.
The Vietnamese have recognised the limitations of or­
thodox models of socialist development. It remains to be 
seen, however, whether their new road can avert the sense 
of major crisis now deepening in other formerly centrally- 
planned economies around the world.
GRAHAM LARCOMBE is an economist on leave from the 
Victorian government
To traditional supporters of central planning, state 
socialism, and a dominant role for communist parties, the 
rapid liberalisation of the Vietnamese economy must be 
seen as a retreat to capitalism. In response, a couple of 
points should be made. Firstly, the victory of liberation 
forces in small, underdeveloped countries does not 
guarantee the ending of economic problems. Under­
development, characterised by lack of capital, shortages of 
skills, and poverty, is a reality. Secondly, being cut off from 
the rest of the world can hamper development prospects. 
There is a global division of labour. Policies directed at 
selectively encouraging investment and trade can assist in 
expanding the productive forces of the economy, a pre-req- 
uisite for socialism.
Finally, the discrediting of orthodox models of central
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